91-02596/

Cette publication est aussi disponible en français.

FISHING VESSELS

Summaries of Reports of Investigations into Marine Casualties and Accidents Aboard Ships

Issue No. 12 Dec. 1990

Summaries of fishing Vessel Marine Casualties and Accidents

This publication summarizes the Reports of Investigation into marine casualties and/or marine accidents involving fishing vessels which were investigated by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division of Transport Canada and is published three times a year. There is another publication covering commercial vessels.

Note:

1. A glossary of terms and abbreviations used can be found at the end of this publication.

2. In this publication, unless stated otherwise:

   - all times mentioned are local times;
   - all Regulations referred to are made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act, and
   - all vessels referred to are Canadian.

The full report of the summaries contained herein may be obtained by writing to:

Director
Canadian Transportation Accident
Investigation and Safety Board
Investigations - Marine
P.O. Box 9120
Alta Vista Terminal
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1G 3T8

Readers are reminded that this publication and the Reports of Investigation issued by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division are released for accident prevention purposes only and are confined to cause-related circumstances.

Their contents may be deficient and misleading if used in any other process and are not to be used or admitted in evidence in any legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, arising out of any casualty described therein. The statements, opinions and findings in the reports and summaries are those of the Marine Casualty Investigations Division only and do not constitute admissions made by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada.

Effective March 29, 1990, the mandate to conduct investigations into Marine occurrences was transferred to the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board (CTAISB) - Investigations Marine. In accordance with the Act establishing this new organization, outstanding investigations conducted under the Canada Shipping Act prior to this date are being completed and distributed by CTAISB - Investigations Marine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

			Page
1.	CFV "151033"	Loss of life	1
2.	"ABOUND"/ "MARY ROBERTA"	Collision	5
3.	"POSEIDON PRINCESS"	Loss of life	10
4.	"KIMBERLY DAWN"	Sinking - 2 deaths	14
5.	"MENZIES BAY"	Diving accident - 1 death	18
6.	"MUST 'N' TELL"	Sinking	22
7.	"BENNETT BROS"/	Loss of life	26
8.	"PARSLA"/	Capsize - 1 death	30
Glossary			35

CFV "151053"

Loss of two fishermen Bonne Bay, Newfoundland, August 7, 1989

Summary

The 6.7 m long fiberglass open boat, CFV "151053" powered by a 35 h.p. outboard motor was owned and operated by Gerald Adey. During the fishing season he was assisted by his brother, Roy M. Adey. The two brothers were officially licensed as full-time fishermen by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

On the morning of August 7, 1989, at about 0700, the two fishermen left their fishing community of Cooks Harbour to attend their nets which were set in 2-5 fathoms of water in the vicinity of Cooks Harbour and Bonne Bay. Some fishermen from the community watched them leaving Cooks Harbour in their open boat that morning. They were expected to return home before noon that day.

The fishing vessel "NORTHERN TIP" had left Cooks Harbour that morning about 0530, fished briefly in a position one mile outside Cooks Harbour, then returned shortly after 0700. While the "NORTHERN TIP" was inbound, she passed the open boat outbound. There was no verbal communication between them and the Adey boat was not equipped with a VHF or CB radio. The weather was not considered favourable for fishing by the skipper of the "NORTHERN TIP". Weather conditions at the time were reported clear with good visibility, easterly winds at 20-25 knots and the wave height was about 1.5 m.

At approximately 1330 while three concerned local fishermen were looking for the two overdue fishermen, they found the fiberglass boat overturned and battering against the rocks on the southeast corner of Bonne Bay. They also found two oars, a gas tank and debris. The outboard motor was later located in 2 m of water and it was recovered by a fishing boat and delivered to the RCMP.

MRSC St. John's was notified, thus initiating an official SAR response. After an extensive search, the bodies of both fishermen were recovered. Subsequent autopsies revealed the cause of death to be drowning.

Findings

On the morning of August 7, 1989 while on the fishing grounds hauling their nets, two brothers, Gerald and Roy Adey, were lost overboard when their fibreglass open boat swamped and/or overturned in the prevailing sea condition in the vicinity of rock-infested shallow waters.

In the absence of any witness to the casualty, it would appear they lost their lives due to the following contributing factors:

- the sea condition was considered rough that morning for fishing in Bonne Bay;
- the victims were not wearing any form of flotation device;
- they were wearing heavy clothing and were non-swimmers; and
- the cold seawater temperature limited their survival time.





"CFV 151053"

REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4509	SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE No 4509 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS	PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES



Outboard motor and support bracket.

Moteur hors-bord et patte de support.

Heavy damage to the bow and starboard side of the boat.

Avaries importantes à l'avant et au côté tribord et l'embarcation.

"ABOUND"/"MARY ROBERTA"

Collision in Active Pass, B.C., October 3, 1989.

Summary

"MARY ROBERTA"

The 37 gross ton, 15.3 long, wooden seiner "MARY ROBERTA" was manned by a crew of 5. Included in her navigation equipment were a radar, a VHF R/T, a Loran C and an auto-pilot. At 0708, October 3, 1989, the vessel, northbound, was at the entrance to Active Pass with 3 seiners leading and 2 following her. As she rounded Helen Point, the deck-hand observed a fog bank and, a short time later, the lead vessels disappeared in the fog; the vessel was switched to hand steering. Upon checking the radar, the 3 targets ahead were misinterpreted to be the 3 seiners and the skipper was informed. After the skipper arrived in the wheel-house and when he saw the vessel's course being altered to starboard in order to avoid collision with the tug "EVCO BREEZE" that was towing 2 barges on a short lead, the skipper placed the wheel on hard-a-starboard without checking the radar. Before he could evaluate the situation, the bow of a vessel, later identified to be the "ABOUND", appeared off the starboard side and a last minute evasive action taken was unsuccessful. Both vessels were involved in a collision around 0720. She sustained extensive damage and began to settle quickly by the stern.

"ABOUND"

The 99 gross ton, 22.10 m long, wooden seiner "ABOUND" was manned by a crew of 6. Her navigation equipment included a radar, a VHF R/T, a Loran C and an auto-pilot. At about 0715, October 3, 1989, the vessel, northbound Active Passage, passed abeam of Enterprise Reef with 2 deck-hands standing the watch and the vessel being steered by auto-pilot. After passing Helen Point about 1 cable off, she entered fog. Upon learning the presence of the tug "EVCO BREEZE" in the Passage, she was manoeuvred to the starboard of the centre of the channel. Another vessel, appearing to be on a collision course with the "ABOUND", was also observed on the radar. At about 0720, the skipper was called and the vessel's speed reduced. She initially altered course to starboard then to port but could not avoid collision. She sustained minor damage to the stern.

Events following the collision

Both vessels assessed their damage. A safety message was broadcast and the "MARY ROBERTA" was eventually towed safely to Steveston, B.C.

Findings

During the early morning hours of October 3, 1989, while transiting Active Pass, B.C., in dense fog, the fishing vessel "MARY ROBERTA" altered course to starboard to avoid collision with the tug "EVCO BREEZE" and, in so doing, was involved in a collision with the fishing vessel "ABOUND" when the bow of the latter came in contact with the starboard side of the "MARY ROBERTA".

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:

Both Vessels - "MARY ROBERTA" and "ABOUND"

- deck-hands in charge of the watch did not have any formal training in radar operation;
- skippers were not called in sufficient time to evaluate the situation;
- did not proceed at a speed considered to be safe under the prevailing visibility;
- did not stop their engines in sufficient time nor did they take all way off their vessels either as a collision avoidance action or to give both vessels additional time to evaluate the situation;
- did not attempt to utilize the VHF R/T to ascertain the intentions of each other; and
- did not sound appropriate fog signals.

"MARY ROBERTA"

- did not heed/hear the advice on VHF channels 11 or 16 that the "EVCO BREEZE" was entering the pass;
- when off Matthews Pt. was initially on the port side of the channel and applied hard-to-starboard helm to avoid collision with the tug;
- the skipper, unaware of the presence of the "ABOUND" and, without checking the radar, altered the vessel's course to starboard across the bows of the "ABOUND"; and
- was not maintaining a proper look-out.

"ABOUND"

- deck-hand initially altered the vessel's course to starboard and then to port, i.e. towards the "MARY ROBERTA".

Other Findings

The possibility of a fog bank was not forecast in the marine weather forecast.

The "ABOUND" did not participate in the VTS system.

The auto-pilot aboard the "MARY ROBERTA" was not functioning satisfactorily on a northerly heading, necessitating in the vessel being steered by hand by the lone deck-hand on watch.



NOTE:

1. THIS RECONSTRUCTION, DEPICTING THE MOST PROBABLE TRACES OF VESSELS LEADING TO THE COLLISION, HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH.
2. ALL TRACES AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE

NOTA:

1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS, MARITIMES A RECONSTITUÉ LES ROUTES SUIVIES PAR LES NAVIRES. ON ESTIME QUE CE SONT CELLES QUI REPRÉSENTENT CELLES QUI AURAIENT LE PLUS VRAISEMBLABLEMENT CONDUIT À L'ABORDAGE.
2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS

"ABOUND"/MARY ROBERTA"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3473

SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3473 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN METRES

PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

"MARY ROBERTA"

"ABOUND"

"POSEIDON PRINCESS"

Crew member thrown overboard, East Coast of N.S., October 24, 1989

Summary

The 123 gross ton, 18.87 m long "POSEIDON PRINCESS" is a small stern trawler with navigation bridge and wheel-house situated forward; the fishing operations are carried out from a fish-deck aft and when setting, towing and hauling the trawl net, it leads over the stern and is hauled on board by a large winch situated by, and above, a stern ramp.

The hydraulically powered trawl-winch is operated from a bank of levers situated on the starboard side of a deck which is above the fish-deck and which gives the operator a clear view of the fish-deck working conditions and of the trawl when it is being set, towed and hauled.

The vessel had caught her allowable quota of fish on October 24, 1989. In daylight and good weather conditions with the trawl-winch engaged, preparations were being made for net-cleaning operations. The trawl-winch operator had left his position at the controls, stepped onto the fish-deck slightly forward of and beneath the winch barrel. He was in the process of unshackling a wire warp while standing at a position some 5 m away, when the wire swung with the motion of the vessel and caught on a control lever which is used to operate the trawl-winch, placing the winch into the heaving mode. As the operating levers had been modified and were not of the 'deadman' type, (a 'deadman' type control is one which is demand-activated i.e., spring-loaded, such that the control, when released, will automatically return to the neutral position), it remained in the heaving mode. This caused the cod end of the net to revolve around the barrel and to fall down onto the victim, carrying him under the barrel and over the ramps into the sea while striking parts of the vessel's structure before the operator could reach the controls and stop the winch.

RCC Halifax was notified and despite an extensive search, the victim was not found and the case was subsequently handed over to the RCMP as a 'missing person' case.

Findings

Whilst preparing the trawl net for the cleaning process in good weather conditions, the lead wire swung with the motion of the vessel in a seaway resulting in the trawl-winch becoming accidently engaged and thus causing the trawl-winch operator to be swept overboard.

It would appear that the contributory factors to the accident were as follows:

- the trawl-winch operator had left his position at the controls while the winch was still in gear and therefore operational;

- the trawl-winch operating system which was used by the crew did not ensure the securing of the winch and net, which is contrary to the dictates of good seamanship;

- the operating lever had been modified to prevent its automatic return to the 'stop mode' without knowledge of the Ship Safety Branch of the CCG; and

- the operating lever was not fitted with a device or guard to prevent accidental dislodgement.

Other Findings

The victim was not wearing a personal floatation device.



"POSEIDON PRINCESS"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4001	SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4001 DU SEC
DEPTHS IN METRES	PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

1. THE INFORMATION ON THIS CHART HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH
2. ALL TRACKS AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE

1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS MARITIMES A COMPILÉ LES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR CETTE CARTE
2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS



Trawl winch barrel and net.

Approximate position and attitude of victim prior to the accident.

The cod end was not secured as shown, nor was that the usual practice.

Tambour du treuil de chalut

Position approximative de la victime peu avant l'accident

Le cul-de-chalut n'était pas attaché comme on peut le voir et se n'était pas la pratique habituelle de le faire.



The operating levers and winch wire.

Position in which the operator was standing.

Les manettes de contrôles et le cable du treuil

Endroit où l'opérateur prenait place.

"KIMBERLY DAWN"

Sinking with loss of 2 lives, Grand Manan, N.B., November 6, 1989.

Summary

The 20 gross ton, 11.28 m long Cape Islander "KIMBERLY DAWN" had been recently converted for scallop dragging. On November 5, 1989, following the 1700 weather forecast of southerly winds at 15 kn increasing to 20-30 kn the following morning, it was decided to return to port with a catch of some 4,000 kg of scallops on board; the scuppers were intentionally plugged.

Around 0400, November 6, 1989, when the skipper relieved the deck-hand on watch, the vessel was no more than 10 miles from Grand Manan and the winds had increased to 22-24 kn. At 0430, the skipper, in a VHF R/T conversation with other vessels on channels 69 and 71, indicated that he required a portable pump; the skipper did not seem alarmed and no one was unduly concerned. About half an hour later, the deck-hand was awakened and informed of water being on the after deck and that something had to be done about evacuating it. Upon investigation, large quantities of water were observed to be shipping on board over the stern and that it was too late to attempt to save the vessel; the vessel began to settle rapidly by the stern. The crew of 3 found themselves in the water when the vessel sank. Only one deck-hand, who survived, was wearing a PFD.

Following the loss of visual and radar sighting of the "KIMBERLY DAWN" by other fishing vessels, those other vessels immediately proceeded to the scene. Shortly afterwards, the skipper and a deck-hand were hauled out of the water and taken to a hospital, arriving there at 0615. The skipper was declared dead shortly afterwards whilst the deck-hand spent one day in the hospital and was released. The third crew member was not recovered and is presumed to have drowned.

This casualty is typical of a series of similar sinkings involving this class of vessel, known as 'open construction', whereby waves shipped on board are unable to drain off; already relatively heavily laden, the vessels are overwhelmed. There are many such vessels at risk. This casualty once again emphasises the need for operators to exercise due caution in operating their vessels.

Findings

On November 6, 1989, the small fishing vessel "KIMBERLY DAWN", heavily laden with scallops, en route to Grand Manan, N.B., was swamped and sank off North Head, resulting in the loss of 2 lives.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the

swamping of the the vessel:

- the "KIMBERLY DAWN", which was of open construction, was fairly heavily laden for the weather conditions she encountered;

- with the scuppers submerged, there was no adequate means of draining water accumulated in the well;

- the shipped water thus retained in the well further reduced her effective freeboard aft.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the deaths of the crew members:

- it is probable that the minimum complement of life-saving equipment required for this type of vessel was not on board;

- the cold water and the wind quickly sapped the strength of the men once they were in the water, rendering it difficult to remain afloat;

- there was no distress call initiated that could have permitted other fishing vessels in the vicinity to proceed to their timely assistance.

Other Findings

The "KIMBERLY DAWN" did not carry a liferaft, nor, under the Regulations, was she required to carry one.

After the casualty, no life saving equipment was found among the debris.


1. THE INFORMATION ON THIS CHART HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH
2. ALL TRACKS AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE
1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS MARITIMES A COMPILÉ LES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR CETTE CARTE
2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS
"KIMBERLY DAWN"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4340
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4340 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
POSITION OF SINKING
LIEU DU NAUFRAGE
44°45'N
44°40'N
66°50'W
66°45'W
66°40'W
GRAND MANAN
ROSS ISLAND
Long Island
Rocky Corner
North Head
Castalia
Grand Harbour
Seal Cove
Woodwards Cove
Temple Hill
Beach Hill
Ingalls Head
Black Head
Great Duck Island
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH

"KIMBERLY DAWN"



"MENZIES BAY"

Diving accident with loss of one life - Quadra Island, B.C., November 13, 1989.

Summary

The Vancouver-registered, 22 gross ton, single-screw "MENZIES BAY" was a seiner converted to a dive tender and utilized in the Sea Urchin Harvesting Operation. Two 76 m long umbilical supplied surface air from a compressor to the diver. The vessel, with a crew of 4 comprising the owner/operator, 2 divers and a diver's tender (appropriately certificated) departed Campbell River, B.C. on November 13, 1989 bound for fishing grounds off Quadra Island, B.C.

The victim discussed with the crew his dive plan to make a bottom survey for urchins by 'lifeboating' - a method wherein a diver walks on the seabed with the vessel manoeuvring to follow him. A safety check of the diving equipment worn by the victim was carried out by a second diver and it was found that the bail-out air tank was empty, however, the skipper was not informed. Also, the diving helmet which provided built-in voice communication with the surface was not worn as it was cumbersome and instead a system of 'pulls' on the umbilical cord was used.

As is common in small scale diving operations in the seafood harvesting industry, the divers rotated jobs and although the diver remaining on board acted in the capacity of dive supervisor, he had no effective authority over the diver.

About 5 minutes into the dive, the umbilical had fouled the propeller and being tightly wrapped around its shaft, the diver's air supply was cut off.

The victim was pulled to the surface and, as he showed no vital signs, cardio pulmonary resuscitation (C.P.R.) and artificial respiration (A.R.) were applied.

Meanwhile, authorities were notified. The victim was transported to a hospital in Campbell River where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The cause of death was determined to be to asphyxia associated with drowning in a commercial diving accident.

Findings

On the morning of November 13, 1989 a commercial diver working on a Sea Urchin Harvesting Operation with a fixed air system off the fishing vessel "MENZIES BAY" was engaged in a 'lifeboating'

exercise while surveying for product when his umbilical became entwined in the propeller shaft cutting off his air supply and resulting in death by asphyxiation associated with drowning.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the casualty:

- the victim, although well trained, made a dive knowing that his emergency bail-out air cylinder was empty;
- the owner/operator was not informed that the diver's emergency bail-out air cylinder was empty;
- the victim, did not drop his weight belt and carry out 'air-off' procedures;
- the victim did not utilize the available voice communication system with the surface and the alternative system of pulls adopted by him was ineffective;
- the "MENZIES BAY" was not a highly manoeuvrable vessel necessary for 'lifeboating' operations;
- the 'lifeboating' operation was carried out in unfavourable prevailing sea conditions, i.e., swell and current; and
- the diver's tender was not sufficiently experienced for the task at hand.

Other Findings

The Seafood Harvesting Industry is federally regulated for fishing quotas and fishing vessel safety, but, in the absence of specific Federal Commercial Diving Regulations applicable to aquatic activity, the B.C. Workers' Compensation Board has asserted Regulatory authority within the confines of the Workers' Compensation Act of B.C.


1. THE INFORMATION ON THIS CHART HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH
2. ALL TRACKS AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE
1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS MARITIMES A COMPILÉ LES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR CETTE CARTE
2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS
Quathiaski Cove
Public
BC Ferries
Pidcock Cr
IR
SGBo
QY
Fl
BC Ferries
FIG
Public
CAMPBELL RIVER
YACULTA
BANK
Public
Yaculta
IR
SUTIL CHANNEL
Francisco Pt
SGBo
SG
Bo
POSITION AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT
POSITION AU MOMENT DE L'ACCIDENT
50°00'N
125°10'W
WILBY SHOALS
Cape Mudge
Fl WR 5s 18m
Fog Sig 30s
(38)
R Lte
(26)
Carte 3540
IMIT / LIMITE DU PORT
CAUTION A Voir ATTENTION A
"MENZIES BAY"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3539
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3539 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
VANCOUVER
NANAIMO
ISLAND
VICTORIA
Fraser R

"MENZIES BAY"

Diving equipment in use at time of accident.
Équipement de plongée utilisé au moment de l'accident.

"MUST 'N' TELL"

Sinking off Glace Bay, N.S., December 2, 1989.

Summary

The 93 gross ton, 18.6 m long fishing vessel "MUST 'N' TELL" was divided into 4 main compartments by W/T bulkheads, forming from forward a cabin, engine compartment, fish hold and lazaret. A 50 mm pipe penetrated the bulkhead between the fish hold and the lazaret and was designed to permit any water accumulated in the lazaret to drain, by gravity, to a bilge suction manifold at the after end of the engine compartment.

The vessel, with a catch of some 41,708 kg of fish on board of which 908 kg was penned on the afterdeck, was on her return trip to Glace Bay, in darkness, on December 2, 1989. The winds were NNW'ly at 15-20 knots and slight seas. The vessel, trimmed by the stern and in a deep loaded condition, occasionally shipped water on deck through the freeing ports, as she rolled gently with the wind and sea on the starboard quarter. At about 2200, upon noticing that the vessel had developed a port list, she was stopped, the fish on deck was jettisoned, the nets moved to starboard, pumps actuated and a broadcast made on VHF R/T channel 77 requesting assistance.

Once upright, the vessel resumed steaming. Around 2300, the list to port had become pronounced and as the vessel continued to settle deeper in the water by the stern, the skipper ordered her abandoned. Six crew members safely abandoned the vessel into an inflatable liferaft whilst the skipper floated free of the sinking vessel. The skipper, a non-swimmer, had donned neither a lifejacket nor an immersion suit. Some 15 minutes later, the crew were all picked up by other fishing vessels in the area and transported to Glace Bay. Around 2345, the "MUST 'N' TELL", valued at some $1,000,000, and fish estimated at $23,000 sank some 19 miles off Glace Bay.

All crew members were rescued, transported and landed at North Sydney. The skipper was taken to a hospital, treated and released shortly thereafter.

Findings

Whilst on passage from fishing grounds north of Sydney, Cape Breton, on December 2, 1989, in a deep laden condition, in mainly fine weather with a 15-20 knot NNW'ly winds, slight seas, the fishing vessel "MUST 'N' TELL" sank due to ingress of water, the

source of which is not positively ascertainable.

It would appear that the following factors may have contributed towards the loss:

- water ingress to the after part of the vessel, possibly the lazaret, due to a fracture in the shell plating, or the failure of the rudder trunk gland or bearing, in way of the lazaret;

- the cumulative free-surface and trimming effects of water retained on deck, slack liquids in partially full tanks, loose fish catch in hold and undetected floodwater in the lazaret, which reduced the heavily loaded vessel's transverse stability and ability to recover from the quartering sea motion induced rolling; and

- subsequent downflooding in the engine compartment and forward compartment which overcame the vessel's reserve buoyancy.

Other Findings

The "MUST 'N' TELL" carried a crew in excess of that stipulated on her SIC 29 certificate; however, she had sufficient life-saving equipment on board.

The "MUST 'N' TELL" sailed from Glace Bay on or about October 13, 1989, without a valid Safety Inspection Certificate (SIC 29) on board.

Of a crew of seven, four including the skipper who was a non-swimmer, did not wear any form of life-saving equipment whilst abandoning the vessel.

None of the crew aboard the "MUST 'N' TELL" were in possession of an RORC (Maritime) to operate a radio station.

The vessel had a recent history of shell plating fractures in way of the lazaret, the causes of which were not determined when repairs were carried out.


"MUST 'N' TELL"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4022
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4022 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
NEW BRUNSWICK
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
NOVA SCOTIA
CAMPBELLTON
MONCTON
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
FREDERICTON
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
1. THE INFORMATION ON THIS CHART HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH
2. ALL TRACKS AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE
1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS MARITIMES A COMPILÉ LES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR CETTE CARTE
2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS
SINK POSITION
POSITION DU NAUFRAGE
46°30'N
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
(NOVA SCOTIA)
ST ANN'S
61°W
60°W

"MUST 'N' TELL"

May 1985 Mai 1985

"BENNETT BROS"

Loss overboard of lone operator, Grand Manan Island, N.B., December 2, 1989.

Summary

The 13 gross ton, 11.16 m Canadian, wooden fishing vessel "BENNETT BROS" is a typical combination longliner/lobster fishing boat employed in the Bay of Fundy. The fore deck is forward of the wheel-house and a well deck aft, some 70 cm below the gunwale level, extends to the lazaret.

On the afternoon of the December 2, 1989, the "BENNETT BROS" departed Seal Cove, N.B., with 20 lobster traps onboard. She was manned by a lone operator and was bound for the lobster fishing grounds near South Head, Grand Manan Island; the regular crew comprised 2 persons. A 20 m line, with a marker buoy secured at one end, was secured to each lobster trap that was to be set in 10-20 m of water. The weather was fine and clear with light winds, calm sea and over 5 miles visibility.

The vessel was last seen for 5-10 minutes in the vicinity of Buck Rock by 2 witnesses from Pats Cove at about 1600, before she headed eastward. At about 1745, another fishing vessel, the "GOLDEN COWRIE", operating off South Head, noticed a small vessel with her running lights, later identified to be the "BENNETT BROS", about one mile to seaward. Upon approaching the vessel, it was established that no one was on board and that the engine was running in neutral. Search of the area was commenced and CGRS Yarmouth notified and, in response to a broadcast for assistance from other fishing vessels in the area, some 20 responsed. Following a brief search, at 1820 the body of the operator, clad in seasonal clothing, winter jacket and rubber boots, was found about 0.5 mile south-east of South Head and about 1 mile from the drifting vessel. The victim was not wearing any form of PFD but apparently, the entrapped air between the body and the winter jacket kept him from sinking. He was transported to a local hospital where, following examination, he was pronounced dead.

Autopsy revealed the cause of death to be due to drowning. Toxicology examination revealed that the victim's blood/alcohol concentration was 300 MGM %, well above the legal limit of 80 MGM % for operating a vessel.

Findings

On December 2, 1989 whilst operating the fishing vessel "BENNETT BROS" to set lobster traps on the lobster fishing grounds at the south-east entrance to Seal Cove, Grand Manan Island in good weather conditions, the lone operator fell overboard and drowned.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the accident:

- the well deck and gunwale covering board were slippery with small patches of ice and frozen snow;
- the victim was under the influence of alcohol;
- the 4°C water temperature limited the victim's survival time;
- the victim was not wearing any form of PFD;
- as the fall overboard was not witnessed, there was no immediate assistance available;
- having fallen overboard, there was nothing on or over the ship's side that could have assisted the operator to reboard the vessel.



1. THE INFORMATION ON THIS CHART HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH
2. ALL TRACKS AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE

1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS MARITIMES A COMPILÉ LES RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR CETTE CARTE
2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS

"BENNETT BROS" secured alongside Seal Cove, Grand Manan Island.

"BENNETT BROS" au poste d'amarrage de Seal Cove, Île Grand Manan.

Small patches of ice and frozen snow on the well deck and gunwale covering board.

Petites plaques de glaces et de neige sur le pont-coffre et sur la planche recouvrant la lisse de pavois.

"PARSLA"

Capsizing of a lifeboat with loss of one life, Point Tupper, N.S., December 22, 1989.

Summary

The 3,552 gross ton Russian fish factory/freezer vessel "PARSLA", with a crew of 88, was anchored in the Strait of Canso and engaged in 'over the side' purchases of herring from local fishing vessels. The vessel was equipped with a 1988-built, 37-person, totally enclosed, self-righting, USSR-Register approved GRP lifeboat meeting SOLAS requirements.

On December 22, 1989, following a shopping excursion, the lifeboat #3 returned from Port Hawkesbury with 31 POB (all crew members) and secured starboard side alongside the vessel's accommodation ladder. After opening the lifeboat's top canopy hatches, six persons climbed out and onto the accommodation ladder. Of the remaining, seven persons remained seated in the lifeboat awaiting their turn to disembark. When 18 others climbed out of the hatch with some proceeding along the starboard gunwale, the lifeboat suddenly capsized, throwing them into the icy cold waters while entrapping 7 within the lifeboat. As no seat belts were used, the weight of the 7 persons was now transferred to the underside of the canopy and water was now ingressing through the open hatches. The combined effect adversely affected the lifeboat's self-righting capabilities. The weather was fine with -15° C air temperature and 0° C sea temperature.

General alarm was immediately sounded aboard the vessel and, under the direction of the first mate, rescue operations were initiated. All with the exception of one crew member were rescued and treated for hypothermia. The lifeboat was subsequently turned on her side at 1749 and the unconscious entrapped crew member rescued. CPR was administered but the victim never gained consciousness. She was transported to a hospital where, following examination, she was declared dead at 2035.

Autopsy revealed the cause of death to be due to severe pulmonary edema, consistent with drowning; the victim having sustained injuries which included fractured ribs.

Findings

Whilst the self-righting lifeboat #3 lay secured alongside the fish factory/freezer vessel "PARSLA" on December 22, 1989 and was engaged in disembarking 31 crew members, the lifeboat suddenly capsized when 18 crew members were concentrated along the starboard side and on top of the canopy throwing them into the icy cold water and trapping 7 others in the lifeboat, resulting in the loss of one life.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the capsizing of the lifeboat and reducing her self-righting capability:

- there was no clearly defined command situation aboard the lifeboat;
- the combined effect of the weight of 18 crew members above the lifeboat's centre of gravity reduced her transverse stability and the heeling moment caused by the rapid movement of the crew members to starboard resulted in the her capzing to starboard;
- once capsized, the self-righting capability of the lifeboat was drastically reduced by the combined effect of the weights of the 7 trapped occupants now effectively transferred to the underside of the canopy, as seat belts were not being worn and the added weight of the flood water entering through the open hatch escapes acting on the underside of the canopy.

The stewardess lost her life due to the following contributing factors:

- she was unable to escape with six others who were also initially trapped in the capsized lifeboat and she was later found to be injured;
- following the capsize of the lifeboat, it was not realized that she was missing until an estimated 30 minutes or longer had elapsed resulting in loss of valuable time;
- following the lifeboat's capsize, the injuries sustained by the victim further reduced her already limited survival time due to immersion in cold water;
- upon succumbing to hypothermia, she lost consciousness and drowned.

Other Findings

Assistance from 2 Russian vessels was not possible as their lifeboat engines would not start due to cold.



"PARSLA"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4306	SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4306 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS	PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

"PARSLA"

No. 3 life boat. Embarcation de sauvetage N° 3.



No. 3 life boat, showing side and top hatches raised.

Vue des portes d'accès latérales et de l'écoutille du dessus ouverte de l'embarcation de sauvetage N° 3.

Glossary

CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CCGC	Canadian Coast Guard Cutter
CCGS	Canadian Coast Guard Ship
CGRS	Coast Guard Radio Station
CMRA	Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary
ETA	Estimated time of arrival
Fish Packers	Fishing vessels being used only for transportation of fish
FPV	Fisheries Patrol Vessel
Free surface effect	Whenever there is a surface of liquid which is free to move, there is a loss of effective GM due to a virtual rise of the vessel's centre of gravity and the loss of stability caused by the movement of liquid in partially filled compartments when the vessel rolls. This movement may involve a large shift of weight.
Freeboard	The distance between the waterline and the upper edge of the weather deck.
FV	Fishing Vessel
GM	The distance between the transverse metacentre and the vertical centre of gravity, and is an indication of a vessel's ability to right herself when heeled over.
M	Magnetic
Mayday	Distress signal
MEDEVAC	The urgent evacuation of a person from a vessel for medical reasons
MRSC	Marine Rescue Sub-Centre
Port of Refuge	A reasonably safe place of retreat from winds or storms

r.p.m.	Revolution per minute
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
SAR	Search and Rescue
SFV	Small fishing vessel
SIC	Steamship Inspection Certificate
SSB	Single sideband radio
T	True
Trim	The difference between the draught forward and aft
VHF	Very high frequency radio